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Spotting the intentions of a pickpocket in a crowded environment may save a few dollars. If
you are a police officer, then identifying a suspect who is pretending to reach for a wallet while
actually pulling a gun can be a matter of life or death. These examples illustrate that detecting
deceptive intentions from other persons’ actions is of great practical importance in many social
contexts. Although it is well known that humans can identify deceptive intentions based on bodily
cues, our understanding of deception detection, however, is still quite limited, partly because a
comprehensive theoretical framework of deception detection is lacking. This is different for pro-
social human interactions like playing a piano duet. In this context, overarching and unifying
explanations are available based on the concept of embodied simulation. Here I propose that
embodied simulation is perhaps the most promising steppingstone to develop a comprehensive
embodied theory of deception detection as well. Embodied simulation is typically construed as
the interplay between action and perception and it also incorporates the interplay with cognition
and emotion. In my view, integrating and studying motor, perceptual, cognitive and emotional
processes is imperative to understand how deceptive intentions can be detected from human
movements. This opinion paper aims at fleshing out this idea and providing some first suggestions
and hypotheses on how to achieve the ultimate goal to develop an encompassing embodied theory
of deception detection in (anti)social interactions.
To start with, deception can be defined as an act that aims to mislead an observer into making
an incorrect judgment about the actor’s (i.e., deceiver’s) true action intention (Cañal-Bruland and
Schmidt, 2009). To date most research on deception has been dedicated to detecting deceit in verbal
communication (i.e., lying) (e.g., Bond et al., 1992; Frank and Ekman, 1997; Ekman et al., 1999);
less research has been devoted to non-verbal cues in catching liars (e.g., Ekman and Friesen, 1969;
Vrij, 2004, 2006); and, despite its obvious relevance, remarkably little research has been done to
better understand the detection of deceptive intentions embodied in movements (e.g., Runeson
and Frykholm, 1983; Cañal-Bruland and Schmidt, 2009; Sebanz and Shiffrar, 2009).
Since the pioneering work by Runeson and Frykholm (1983) it is commonly accepted that
observers can distinguish between deceptive and non-deceptive intentions based on bodily cues.
Their original study revealed that information conveyed by joint kinematics alone was not only
sufficient to accurately judge the weight of a carried box but also to recognize whether the actor
carrying the box intended to mislead the observer about the true weight of the box. Yet, despite
Runeson and Frykholm’s important finding, as well as recent work exploring expertise effects and
neuronal mechanisms contributing to successful deception detection from bodily actions (e.g.,
Kunde et al., 2011; Brault et al., 2012; Tomeo et al., 2012; Mori and Shimada, 2013; Wright et al.,
2013; Renden et al., 2014; Wright and Jackson, 2014), the underlying psychological processes that
allow human observers to successfully recognize deceptive intentions from others’ bodily actions
remain largely unknown.
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To unravel the psychological processes that allow human
observers to successfully recognize deceptive actions from others’
bodily actions, it is of paramount importance to develop and
establish an encompassing theoretical framework to study and
explain deception detection. A novel theoretical backdrop is
necessary because in contrast to the study of pro-social human
interactions (including joint actions such as playing a piano
duet, see Sebanz et al., 2006), there is a definite need for
such a theoretical framework to account for antisocial human
interactions, in which human agents attempt to mislead and
potentially harm others. This is particularly true for the field of
deception detection.
Here it is proposed that the most promising way to develop
a theory for deception detection is to start from recent theories
of embodiment that have proven successful in explaining pro-
social human interactions by focusing on the tight links between
perception and action such as the common coding theory (Prinz,
1997; Hommel et al., 2001; Schütz-Bosbach and Prinz, 2007).
These theories are groundbreaking in that they break away from
the Cartesian view that perception and action constitute distinct
entities. On the contrary, they argue that perceptual processes are
grounded in the motor system in a way that action capabilities
and intentions shape what we see and how we interpret what we
see.
However, these ideas need be extended in order to establish
an embodied theory of deception detection, because next to
perceptual and motor influences on deception detection, other
psychological processes may also contribute to antisocial human
interactions such as cognitions (e.g., thoughts) and emotions
(e.g., empathic feelings). Hence, I suggest to supplement existing
perception-action theories with findings from social cognitive
neuroscience pointing at the links between perception and action
representations with cognitions and emotions (Gallese, 2001,
2003; Keysers and Gazzola, 2009). Key assumption of this idea is
that the ability underlying the successful detection of deceptive
action intentions in others’ movements is rooted in embodied
simulation (Freedberg and Gallese, 2007). Embodied simulation
enables observers to (implicitly) activate their own internal
representations of bodily states associated with the observed
actions, emotions and cognitions (Freedberg and Gallese, 2007).
I suggest that a deeper understanding of antisocial human
interactions such as in deception detection can only be gained
if we integrate not only the mapping of motor and perceptual
representations, but also include the interplay between internal
representations of bodily states with cognitions and emotions.
The concept of embodied simulation can unify motor,
perceptual, cognitive and emotional processes into one
integrative framework that has the potential to develop
into a novel, comprehensive embodied theoretical framework for
the exploration of deception detection (see Figure 1).
How can one test the assumptions and implications of
this view? To start with, common-coding theory argues
that the perception and production of (deceptive and non-
deceptive) actions share common representations (Prinz, 1997;
Hommel et al., 2001; Schütz-Bosbach and Prinz, 2007).
Because perception and action are deemed tightly coupled
by common representations, they can mutually induce each
FIGURE 1 | An embodied theoretical framework for the exploration of
deception detection.
other. This reciprocal influence has been substantiated by
neurophysiological studies that identified brain networks that
respond to the observation as well as the production of an action
(Di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). It
follows that a high similarity between perceptual and motor
representations promotes action perception. That is, observers
are predicted to be perceptually better attuned to observed
movements that form part of one’s own motor repertoire,
typically acquired through personal action experience (Schütz-
Bosbach and Prinz, 2007). In other words, the more action
experience an observer has accumulated with executing a specific
movement, the better the perception of the same movement
should be when executed by another person (referred to as the
“motor experience hypothesis,” Cañal-Bruland et al., 2010). This
contention has received empirical support from both behavioral
studies (Knoblich and Flach, 2001; Loula et al., 2005; Casile and
Giese, 2006; Cañal-Bruland et al., 2011, 2012) and brain imaging
recordings (Calvo-Merino et al., 2005, 2006).
There is initial evidence that this hypothesis also holds true
for deception detection. Sebanz and Shiffrar (2009) reported that
expert basketball players outperformed novices in identifying
fake pass movements when presented with short video clips
but not with static images (see also Jackson et al., 2006; Cañal-
Bruland and Schmidt, 2009; Cañal-Bruland et al., 2010). They
also showed that experts maintained their superior performance
when presented with point-light-animations (only displaying
kinematic landmarks), while novices did not perform better than
chance (see also Williams et al., 2009). These results indicate that
the motor repertoire of an observer indeed plays a crucial role in
deception detection.
As depicted in Figure 1, detecting deception from bodily cues
by means of embodied simulation is not exclusively confined to
the fundamental links between perception and action but also
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includes the inference of cognitive and emotional states. There
is initial evidence for such interactions showing that knowledge
about the likelihood of deceptive actions biases judgments about
whether an observed movement may be deceptive or not (Cañal-
Bruland and Schmidt, 2009; see also Wright et al., 2013; Mann
et al., 2014).
Movements convey critical information (Johansson, 1973,
1976; for a review, see Blake and Shiffrar, 2007) that allow
human observers to discriminate subtle movement differences
(Cutting et al., 1978; Runeson and Frykholm, 1983; Bertenthal
et al., 1985). A seminal experimental approach is to present
participants with a subset of anatomical landmarks representing
different joint centers of an actor as moving points of
light, called point-light displays (PLDs; see Cañal-Bruland
and Williams, 2010). Of particular relevance for embodied
simulation is that based on such PLDs humans are able to
recognize one’s own identity (Beardsworth and Buckner, 1981;
Jokisch et al., 2006), the identity of friends (Cutting and
Kozlowski, 1977), gender (Pollick et al., 2005), and also to
predict action intentions and movement effects (Abernethy
et al., 2001; Huys et al., 2009; Williams et al., 2009), including
the detection of deceptive action intentions (Runeson and
Frykholm, 1983; Sebanz and Shiffrar, 2009). Perhaps even
more relevant for the embodied simulation argument is that
based on kinematics alone human observers can also accurately
identify emotions like happiness and sadness (Dittrich et al.,
1996; Atkinson et al., 2004) or discern expression intensities
in dance movements (Sevdalis and Keller, 2012). Intriguingly,
in a recent study by Sevdalis and Keller (2012) judgment
accuracy was positively correlated with self-reported empathy
indices. This underscores the role of emotions such as empathic
feelings for judgments of observed movements and links
directly to the convincing evidence that embodied simulation
also accounts for how humans empathize with each other
(Gallese, 2001; Gallese et al., 2004; de Vignemont and Singer,
2006).
To summarize, because (a) movements convey critical
information for action recognition and the inference of cognitive
and emotional states of human agents, and because (b) human
observers are able to identify action intentions as well as cognitive
and emotional states from others’ bodily actions by means of
embodied simulation, it seems imperative to explore the joint
contributions of perceptual, motor, cognitive and emotional
processes to deception detection, with the aim to develop an
integrative embodied theory of deception detection. A promising
way to do so is based on the following observation: if cognitions
and emotions influence perception-action-informed judgments
about deceptive action intentions, there are essentially two
possible ways in which this could be effectuated: (1) either
cognitions and emotions influence the perceptual sensitivity
directly, which then eventually leads to different judgments, or
(2) cognitions and emotions change, that is, shift the judgment
criterion (independent of the perceptual sensitivity), thereby
causing a judgment bias. Based on some preliminary findings
from my own lab (Cañal-Bruland and Schmidt, 2009; Cañal-
Bruland et al., 2015), I consider the latter more likely than the
former. That is, I hypothesize that cognitions as well as emotions
bias the judgments about rather than perception of deceptive
actions. However, future research is needed to scrutinize these
ideas and thereby improve our understanding of deception
detection in action.
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